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It appears that the facts of the principal case bring it clearly within
Category III discussed above; vi., the peril of the plaintiff was not
actually discovered by the defendant, but should have been; the plaintiff
was physically unable to prevent his injury through the exercise of due
care. That being the case, both the weight of precedents and the sounder
reasoning would seem to have required a reversal of the nonsuit which
was granted below. The weight to be given to the contrary result,
considering the court's orthodox statement of the rule, 3' must await
further decisions.
LUKE R. CORBETT
Torts-Physicians and Surgeons-Liability for Signing a Certificate
of Insanity Without Proper Examination of the Alleged Lunatic
In Bailey v. McGill' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
two physicians in signing certificates of insanity under G.S. § 122-432
were absolutely immune from civil liability to an alleged mentally disordered plaintiff. 3 The rationale of the court was that the defendant
physicians were protected by the absolute privilege given to witnesses for
statements made by them in a judicial proceeding.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant physicians did not make an
3 "Liability
on the new act arises after the defendant has had sufficient opportunity, in the exercise of ordinary care, to discover and to appreciate the plaintiff's perilous position in time to avoid injuring him." 247 N.C. at 498, 101 S.E.2d
at 317.

N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-43 (1952). This statute provides: "When an affidavit
and request for examination of an alleged mentally disordered person has been
1247

made... the clerk of the superior court . . . shall direct two physicians .. . to

examine the alleged mentally disordered person . . . to determine if a state of
mental disorder exists and if it warrants commitment to one of the State hospitals
or institutions for the mentally disordered. If the said physicians are satisfied
that the -alleged mentally disordered person should be committed for observation
and admission into a hospital for the mentally disordered, they shall sign an
affidavit to that effect . ...

The institution of the lunacy proceeding is provided for by N.C. GEN. STAr.
§ 122-42 (1952) : "When it appears that a person is suffering from some mental
disorder and is in need of observation or admission in a State hospital, some
reliable person having knowledge of the facts shall make before the clerk of the
superior court of the county in which alleged mentally disordered person is or
resides,. . . an affidavit that the alleged mentally disordered person is in need of
observation or admission in a hospital for the mentally disordered ...."
' The court held as to a third defendant physician that the plaintiff had stated
a cause of action for abuse of process under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-42 (1952), because it was alleged that this physician through ill will and malice toward the
plaintiff persuaded the plaintiff's parents to institute the lunacy proceeding and
state that plaintiff was suffering from a mental disorder and was in need of
observation and admission to a mental institution. However, on retrial of the
issue in the Cleveland County Superior Court the case against this physician was
dismissed after the close of plaintiff's evidence, evidently on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to go to the jury. It is not known whether an appeal was
taken from this decision.
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examination of him as required by G.S. § 122-43; or if an examination were made, it was a hasty and superficial one and not a bona fide
examination as required by the statute. As a result of these certificates
of insanity and this allegedly wrongful and negligent conduct on the
part of the defendants, plaintiff was committed to the State Hospital
for the Insane by the Clerk of the Superior Court of Cleveland County
and forced to remain there for thirty days, at the end of which time it
was concluded that he was not insane and never had been. For his
humiliation in becoming known as a mental case, plaintiff demanded
both compensatory and punitive damages. The supreme court held that
the trial judge correctly sustained the defendants' demurrer for failure
to state a cause of action.
Plaintiff conceded that the allegations in his complaint did not set
out a cause of action for malicious prosecution, 4 abuse of process, or
false imprisonment;8 however, he maintained that he had stated a cause
of action for "a false certificate of insanity made by two of the defendants," and another cause of action for "a certificate of insanity
negligently made without proper and ordinary care and prudence, and
without due examination and inquiry and proof."' 7 But the court, without stating its reason, rejected this contention, and said, "The nature of
his allegations and charge against these two physicians would seem to
be that of libel."" The court then proceeded to hold that the defendants
were witnesses in a proceeding of a judicial nature before an officer
clothed with judicial powers and were therefore absolutely privileged,
because "a defamatory statement made by a witness in the due course of
a judicial proceeding, which is material to the inquiry, is absolutely privileged, and cannot be made the basis of an action for libel or slander, even
though the testimony is given with express malice and knowledge of
its falsity." The construction of G.S. § 122-46,10 which gives the clerk
"Barnette v. Woody, 242 N.C. 424, 431, 88 S.E.2d 223, 227 (1955), where the
court said "the plaintiff must prove malice, want of probable cause and termination
of the prosecution or proceeding in plaintiff's favor." Accord, Fisher v. Payne,
93 Fla. 1085, 113 So. 378 (1927) ; Brandt v. Brandt, 286 Ill.
App. 151, 3 N.E.2d
96 (1936).
'Barnette v. Woody, supra note 4; Ledford v. Smith, 212 N.C. 447, 193
S.E. 722 (1937). There was no allegation that the defendants had an ulterior
purpose or that they committed an act in the use of the process not proper in the
regular prosecution of the proceeding.
' Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla. 1085, 113 So. 378 (1927); Ussery v. Haynes, 344
Mo. 530, 127 S.W.2d 410 (1939); Dyer v. Dyer, 178 Tenn. 234, 156 S.W.2d 445
(1941). It was not alleged that the commitment was without lawful authority.
But see Bacon v. Bacon, 76 Miss. 458, 24 So. 968 (1899), where two physicians
were held liable for false imprisonment in a lunacy proceeding; however, the
proceeding was not held to be judicial in nature and the court did not discuss the
elements of false imprisonment.
7247
N.C. at 290, 100 S.E.2d at 860.
8Id.at 293, 100 S.E.2d at .866.
°Id. at 293, 100 S.E.2d at 866. Accord, Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N.C. 468, 80
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of the superior court the judicial authority to hold a hearing, to examine
the certificates and affidavits of the physicians and any proper witnesses,
and to commit the alleged mentally disordered person to a mental institution, was the foundation upon which the application of the witness
privilege rule rested. Examining the certificates of the physicians submitted pursuant to G.S. § 122-43 was necessary to the performance of
this judicial authority; therefore, the physicians were deemed to be
witnesses before a judicial hearing and were absolutely privileged in
their testimony. The court said the defendants "were not engaged in the
ordinary practice of their profession. Their role and function in examining the plaintiff and signing the affidavits in respect to his mental
condition are those of witnesses."'"
In holding the defendants' affidavits absolutely privileged, the court
placed North Carolina in accord with the weight of authority in this
area.12 Since insanity is often hard to determine with certainty, public
policy and the administration of the law require that the certifying
physician b6 protected rather than the injured plaintiff who has been
negligently committed to a mental institution as a lunatic.'3 The courts
feel that public policy requires that the witness physician be allowed
to testify without fear of being sued by one whose interests may be
adversely affected by his testimony. 14 It would tend to extend litigation
if the matter could be reexamined in a new action, thereby causing multiplicity of suits. 15
In addition to public policy, some courts say that the plaintiff can

S.E.2d 248 (1954) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 588 (1938).

The witness privilege rule applies to affidavits submitted to the court as well
as to testimony given orally in court. Perry v. Perry, 153 N.C. 266, 69 S.E. 130
(1910).
10
N.C. GEm. STAT. § 122-46 (Supp. 1957).
111247 N.C. at 292, 100 S.E.2d at 866. Accord, Dunbar v. Greenlaw, 128 A.2d
218 (Me. 1956) ; Niven v. Bolan, 177 Mass. 11, 58 N.E. 282 (1900).
" Fisher v. -Payne, 93 Fla: 1085, 113 So. 378 (1927) (absolute privilege as to

affidavit); Corcoran v. Jerrel, 185 Iowa 532, 170 N.W. 776 (1919)

(absolute

privilege as to oral testimony); Dunbar v. Greenlaw, supra note 11 (absolute
privilege) ; Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 118 N.E.2d 356 (1953) (absolute

privilege as to affidavit); Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N.C. 468, 80 S.E.2d 248 (1954)
(absolute privilege, but negligent examination not alleged).

Cf. Niven v. Bolan,

supra note 11 (conditional privilege); Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. (NY) 461
(1860) (conditional privilege).
13 Brandt v. Brandt, 286 Ill. App. 151, 3 N.E.2d 96 (1936) ; Dunbar v. Greenlaw, mpra note 11; Niven v. Bolan, supra note 11.
1 Niven v. Bolan, 177 Mass. 11,
14, 58 N.E. 282, 283 (1900), where the
court said: "It is more important that the administration of the law in the manner
provided should not be obstructed by the fears of physicians that they may render
themselves liable to suit than it is that the person certified by them to be insane,
or a diposomaniac, or inebriate should be a right of action in case it turns out

that the certificate ought not to have been given."

See Mezullo v. Maletz, 331

Mass. 233, 118 N.E.2d 356 (1953); Godette v. Gaskill, 151 N.C. 51, 65 S.E.2d

612 (1909).
" Niven v. Bolan, mspra note 14; Godette v. Gaskill, mtpra note 14.
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get redress in a criminal court if the physician commits perjury.' 6 Some
of the cases mention state statutes which provide for criminal punishment if the plaintiff is wrongfully committed as a result of a conspiracy
17
between the physician and a third person.
Some other opinions join with the majority view and hold the
physician not liable because there was no proximate cause between the
examination of the plaintiff, the signing of the certificate of insanity, and
commitment by the officer with such authority.'
These cases proceed
on the reasoning that the committing authority could commit the alleged
lunatic even though it did not rely on the affidavits of the physicians;
therefore, it cannot be said that the affidavits of the physician caused
the wrongful commitment. 19 The commitment was the sole act of the
committing authority.20 However, this reasoning has been criticized
and said to be contrary to the theory of proximate cause as set out in
22
2
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. ' by Judge Cardozo.
There is a very persuasive minority view2 3 which imposes liability
on the physician on the ground that in examining the plaintiff he has
assumed a statutory duty to use ordinary care and will be liable to the
plaintiff for any breach of the duty.24 This view is led by the English
decisions; however, the commitment statutes in these cases were less
protective of the alleged lunatic and therefore there was more reason
to hold the physician responsible. 25 The only American decision follow1" Dunbar v. Greenlaw, 128 A.2d 218 (Me. 1956) ; Godette v. Gaskill, supra note
14 (dictum) at 52, 65 S.E. at 613.
" Dunbar v. Greenlaw, supra note 16; Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 118
N.E.2d 356 (1953); Niven v. Bolan, 177 Mass. 11, 58 N.E.2d 282 (1900).
18 Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 118 N.E.2d 356 (1953) ; Force v. Probasco,
43 N.J.L. 539 (1881) ; Everett v. Griffiths, [1920] 3 K.B. 163, 1 A.C. 631 (1921)
(distinguished in Harnett v. Fisher, [1927] 1 K.B. 402) ; Brady v. Collom, 68 R.I.
299,0 301, 27 A.2d 311, 312 (1942) (dictum).
' Ibid.
10 Mezullo v. Maletz, supra note 18.
21248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
2"2Notes,

53

MIcH.

L. REV. 493 (1954), 23 U.

CIN.

L. REv. 525 (1954).

"Ayers v. Russell, 50 Hun. 282, 3 N.Y. Supp. 338 (1888) ; Springer v. Steiner,
91 Ore. 100, 178 Pac. 592 (1919) (action for false imprisonment not allowed because plaintiff did not show lack of good faith on part of the physician.) ; Williams
v. Le Bar, 149 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 525 (1891) (but no recovery allowed because the
physician made a mere error in judgment) ; Harnett v. Fisher, [1927] 1 K.B. 402;
Hall v. Semple, 3 F. & F. 337, 176 Eng. Rep. 151 (Q.B. 1862) ; Miller v. West,
165 Md. 245, 247, 167 At. 696, 697 (1933) (dictum). See also Pennell v. Cummings, 75 Me. 163 (1883).
" Ayers v. Russell, supra note 23 at -, 3 N.Y. Supp. at 341, where the court
said: "Their [the physicians] duty must be measured by the trust which the
statute reposes in them, and by the consequences flowing from its improper performance. They assumed the duty by accepting the trust. They are not judicial
officers, but medical experts. They

. .

. are chargeable with that negligence which

attaches to a professional expert who does not use the care and skill which his
profession, per se, implies that he will bring to his professional work."
2"Harnett v. Fisher, [1927] 1 K.B. 402; Hall v. Semple, 3 F. & F. 337, 176
Eng. Rep. 151 (Q.B. 1862).
In Hall v. Semple, supra, the alleged lunatic could be committed to a mental
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ing this view imposed liability on the theory that the privilege should
apply only after the physician has exercised ordinary care in examining
the plaintiff :26 "Their privilege is that, so long as they do their duty with
the care and skill the statute presumes and requires, they are not responsible to the plaintiff for the consequences, however harsh they may
be; for in such a case the law afflicts the plaintiff, but when they do not
use such care and skill it is their personal negligence which afflicts
him." 27 This type of reasoning separates the testimony or affidavit of
the physician from the examination. The testimony is privileged, but
the physician is held liable for ordinary negligence in the examination.
Under these decisions, the plaintiff is not only given redress at law, but
he is less likely to receive a cursory examination, thereby reducing the
likelihood of a sane person's being committed to an institution. 28
In answer to the majority view that public policy requires that the
29
physician be protected, the language of the court in Bacon v. Bacon
appears to be a pertinent reply:
A sad, silent, and fragile little lady, now beyond middle life,
wrongfully declared a lunatic, and that of the most repulsive style,
shut up in a mad house .... and with a stigma branded upon her
name and character which verdicts of juries and judgments of
courts may never wholly efface, and with endurance of such shame,
humiliation, and crucifixion of soul as happily does not often fall
to woman's lot, has appealed to the courts for redress of her
wrongs, and we do not feel authorized to take from her the poor
fruits of her victory.30
The suit was one for false imprisonment and the court does not consider
the witness privilege rule, but the language of the court seems to offer
a persuasive argument for balancing public policy in favor of the alleged
lunatic.
In the principal case, there does not seem to be any doubt that the
lunacy proceeding conducted by the clerk of the superior court was
a judicial proceeding.3 ' It reasonably follows that the role and function
institution on the basis of the physician's certificate alone. His case was not reviewed by legal authorities until after the commitment. In Harnett v. Fisher,
supra, however, a relative of the plaintiff made the petition, a physician signed
the certificate, and the justice appointed for that purpose to perform the duty made
the reception order. This procedure is more similar to the North Carolina
statutes.
Ayers v. Russell, 50 Hun. 282, 3 N.Y. Supp. 338 (1888).

Id. at -, 3 N.Y. Supp. at 341.
Note, 53 MIcH. L. REv. 493 (1954).
"0 76 Miss. 458, 24 So. 968 (1899).
3 Id.at 472, 24 So. at 971.
28

" Corcoran v. Jerrell, 185 Iowa 532, 170 N.W. 776 (1919) ; Perkins v. Mitchell,

31 Barb. (N.Y.) 461 (1860); Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N.C. 468, 80 S.E.2d 248
(1954); Dyer v. Dyer, 178 Tenn. 234, 156 S.W.2d 445 (1941); 33 Am. JuR.,
Libel and Slander § 148 (1941) ; 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander § 104(h) (1948).
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of the physicians in examining the plaintiff and signing the certificates
of insanity expressing their opinion as to the mental condition of the
plaintiff were those of witnesses. But although the law protects the
physician for what he says in the course of a judicial proceeding, the
common law also imposes a duty upon him to use due care in the
practice of his profession.3 2 Surely, the legislature did not intend to
clothe the physician with authority to examine the plaintiff as to his
mental condition and recommend that he be committed to a mental
institution and at the same time abolish this common law duty he owed
to the plaintiff to use due care in examining him. It would appear to
be more logical to say that the legislature intended to supplement the
common law duty with a statutory duty to exercise due care in examining
the plaintiff. The defendants should be privileged in whatever they
testified to in the lunacy proceeding, but the duty to examine properly
the plaintiff under G.S. § 122-43 should be an entirely separable role
and function to be performed by them, not as witnesses, but as men
of professional skill who are required to use due care in examining the
plaintiff as a patient. It is therefore submitted that, although the plaintiff did not state a cause of action for signing a libelous certificate of
insanity, he did state a cause of action for negligence in preparing the
certificate of insanity without first properly examining the plaintiff as
to his mental condition.
By allowing a cause of action for negligence the court could have
balanced the interests between the plaintiff and the defendants. The
physicians would be allowed to testify freely at the hearing before
the clerk of the superior court without fear of a vexatious law suit from
a dissatisfied party, but the court would impose upon them a statutory
and professional duty of exercising ordinary care and skill in examining
the plaintiff, thereby rendering it more likely that the plaintiff would
not be confined in a mental institution without first being properly
examined as to his mental condition. The end result is compliance
with the legal maxim that "for every wrong there is a remedy."
THOMAS S. BENNETT
"Walden v. Jones, 289 Ky. 395, 158 S.W.2d 609 (1942) ; Parkell v. Fitzporter,
301 Mo. 217, 256 S.W. 239 (1923y; Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183
(1940) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 31 (2d ed. 1955) ; 41 A%. JuR., Physiciansand Surgeons
§§ 73, 79 (1942) ; 70 C.J.S., Physicans and Surgeons § 36 (1951).

